Warning. Spoiler Alert. Please Do Not Read The Following Unless You Have Already Read The Apostle.
Q: Your latest thriller, The Apostle takes place largely in Afghanistan. How did you do your research?
A: I travelled to Afghanistan and shadowed a Black Ops team there.
Q: You just rang up Uncle Sam and said “I’d like to embed with a Black Ops team” and our government put it together for you just like that?
A: Not exactly. There are a lot of people throughout the military and intelligence communities who read my novels. Through my books, I’m able to give a voice to people who technically don’t exist. It was one such group who wanted to show me exactly what we were doing in Afghanistan and who invited me over so I could see it firsthand.
Q: How was it?
A: Incredible. We were way, way outside the wire, travelling very low-profile in thin-skinned vehicles. I got to see things most Americans, even most American troops, never get to see.
Q: Did you encounter any Taliban?
A: Yes. I also saw scenes of horrific bombings, ambushes and other attacks. In fact, I was pushing hard to visit a certain location and had the approval of the team leader for us to go, but his second-in-command was dead set against it. He didn’t like the intel he was getting from his sources. He thought the location was too dangerous and that we’d need to bring a lot of extra muscle with us. The second-in-command and the team leader went back and forth until finally the team leader relented. It turned out to be the right decision. The Taliban hit the location we were planning to visit at the exact time we had planned to be there. The toll of dead and wounded was staggering.
Q: So what’s the key to beating the Taliban? More troops?
A: Not necessarily. The key is getting the troops we already have over there off of our forward operating bases and into the villages where they can create direct alliances with village elders and start building solid human networks.
Q: We’re not already doing this?
A: No. We’re making the same mistakes the Soviets made. They were there for ten years (1979-1989). We’re now going into our eighth year. We focus too much on the urban areas and provincial capitals – which is exactly the mistake the Soviet Union made. The Taliban are a rural insurgency and need to be defeated by a robust, all-out rural counterinsurgency. We are not going to win in Afghanistan simply by holding Kabul, Jalalabad or Kandahar. The war in Afghanistan can only be won on the village and district level. The insurgency
can be de-escalated by our military embedding with local villages where we can address real time needs and train local militias. If we bring the Afghan National Army in alongside us and empower them, we can rapidly take American fingerprints off the fighting in Afghanistan.
Q: You’ve also talked about the need to approach this as a branding effort. What do you mean by that?
A: We need to stop militarizing our reconstruction efforts. NATO and the UN are only fig leaves. The Afghans know it’s us calling the shots. We need to stop projecting NATO and “re-brand” efforts to help rebuild the country as UN. The UN is far less threatening and presents a more acceptable face for Afghans. By developing personal relationships with village elders, training their militias and getting them what they need, we empower them. If they are empowered, they’ll not only have no need for the Taliban, but they’ll be more willing to stand up to those foolish enough to come around looking to cause trouble.
Q: General McChrystal is the Secretary of Defense’s pick to be our new commander in Afghanistan. Is he the right man for the job?
A: Politics and war have always been intertwined. Unfortunately, they are usually a misguided and deadly mix. I think General McChrystal is an absolutely fantastic pick; but however his success won’t be based upon what he decides to do in Afghanistan, but rather what the bureaucrats decide to allow him to do. General McChrystal understands counterinsurgency. He has an exceptional resume and grasps what America needs to do to win. Frankly, I think defeating the Taliban will be less of a battle than convincing the powers-that-be in Washington to follow McChrystal’s advice. If we do not succeed, it won’t be because General McChrystal and his staff don’t have the right ideas. It will because our politicians, most of whom have never seen a battlefield, much less even fired a rifle, tried to insert themselves into an arena they know precious little about. To succeed, we need to leave war fighting to the war fighters.
Q: Did your trip to Afghanistan change how you view the war on terror?
A: It did. As a result, I developed an even deeper appreciation for the men and women we have in the field who are working tirelessly and risking everything to keep us safe. It also reaffirmed in me that American exceptionalism is very, very real and we demean it at our own peril. America is not good because it is great. America is great because it is good. We need to not only remember that, we need to begin teaching it once again to our children and to keep reminding each other of it on a daily basis. Our Republic and our way of life has been the greatest force for good the world has ever seen.
Q: How much of your thrillers are based on fact?
A: I think facts are the bedrock of a thriller, especially a political thriller. An author relies on the suspension of disbelief, but that suspension is not a blanket amnesty to create any scenario the author wishes. It’s okay to create a parallel universe in fiction, but it has to operate as close to ours as possible. Mark Twain once said that the only difference between fiction and reality is that people expect fiction to make sense.
Q: The main character of your novels is Navy SEAL turned covert counterterrorism operative Scot Harvath. Is he fashioned after any one person in particular?
A: I have a lot of friends in the Intelligence and Special Operations communities and I draw on many of them for this character. The challenge in bringing back the same main character for each adventure is in keeping him real, keeping him fresh, and keeping him growing. Conflict builds character in my opinion, so my goal is to pit Harvath against real world problems and issues beyond the jeopardy inherent in the novel. Forcing him to struggle with personal issues, just like the rest of us, makes him more human and someone we can all relate to.
Q: You were part of the Department of Homeland Security’s Analytic Red Cell Program. Do any of the terrorist scenarios you developed for the government appear in your novels?
A: No, what I developed there stays there – that was the deal. That said, the ideas I come up with for my novels are created in the same way that the scenarios for the Red Cell Program are.
Q: Why did you become a writer?
A: Ten years ago in Italy on my honeymoon, my wife asked me what I would regret on my deathbed never having done. The answer was easy – writing a novel and getting it published. My wife said to me that when we returned home I needed to spend at least two hours of “protected” time each day (no phone, fax, email…) making that dream become a reality. Well, two hours quickly grew to three, which grew to four and so on. My first novel, The Lions of Lucerne, just poured out of me. It was an amazing feeling of accomplishment. My biggest fear and therefore my biggest obstacle to becoming an author had been, what if I spend all that time and the book is no good? Sometime during that process I realized that what we fear most is often what we are most meant to do.
Q: What’s the worst piece of writing advice you’ve ever heard?
A: Write what you know. If that were true we never would have had a Lord of the Rings, The Chronicles of Narnia, or Harry Potter.
Q: And the best?
A: Write what you love to read because that’s where your passion lies.
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